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CASE NOTE
TORT LAW—What Happened to Duty in Wyoming?
Negligent Supervision of Minors, Loss of a Sibling’s Consortium,
Duty to Inspect One’s Premises, and Negligent Inﬂiction of Emotional
Distress; Hendricks v. Hurley, 184 P.3d 680 (Wyo. 2008).
%RIN -URPHY

INTRODUCTION
On July 31, 2004, an eight-year-old boy, Ryan Hendricks, suffered
electrocution and died after simultaneously touching an outdoor water hydrant
and an ungrounded well head while playing in the yard at his grandparents’ home.1
Though he screamed and fell to the ground, the other children playing in the yard
thought he was joking and failed to immediately realize his injury.2 After trying to
rouse Ryan with no success, one of the children notiﬁed Ryan’s grandparents, the
Hurleys.3 Mr. Hurley carried Ryan into the home and performed CPR while Mrs.
Hurley called for emergency medical personnel.4 The Hurleys called Ryan’s father,
Shawn Hendricks, who arrived on the scene a short time later.5 Shawn called his
wife, Linda, and informed her of the situation as the paramedics tried to revive
their son.6 Paramedics could not revive Ryan at the scene and took him to the
hospital where he later died.7 An inspection of the well by a professional from the
energy company revealed an electrical short at the well cap from the pump caused
the electrocution.8 When Ryan touched the water hydrant and the metal well cap
simultaneously, he became grounded between the two, as approximately 242 volts
of electricity passed through him.9
Ryan’s mother, Linda Hendricks, sued the Hurleys on Ryan’s behalf for
failure to use reasonable care in inspecting the well on their property and for

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2010. I would like to thank my family and
friends for their love and support. Special thanks Professor John Burman for his advice and guidance.
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Hendricks v. Hurley, 184 P.3d 680, 681 (Wyo. 2008).
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Answer of Petitioner at 7, Hendricks v. Hurley, 184 P.3d 680 (Wyo. 2008) (No.
S-007-0178).
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(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 681.
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negligent supervision of the child.10 Linda Hendricks claimed damages on her
own behalf for negligent inﬂiction of emotional distress, and on behalf of Ryan’s
siblings for loss of consortium.11 The District Court of Laramie County granted
the grandparents’ summary judgment motion and Linda Hendricks appealed.12
The issues before the Supreme Court of Wyoming included whether the district
court properly granted summary judgment on: 1) Hendricks’s claim of negligent
supervision on behalf of her son, 2) the loss of consortium claim on behalf of
Ryan’s siblings, 3) Hendricks’s claim of negligent inspection on behalf of her son,
and 4) the claim of negligent inﬂiction of emotional distress on Hendricks’s own
behalf.13
This case note will ﬁrst outline the four areas of Wyoming law under which
Linda Hendricks brought her claims: the duty to supervise minors, loss of
consortium, premises liability, and negligent inﬂiction of emotional distress.14
Next, this note will examine the (ENDRICKS court’s ruling under those areas of law
and argue the court ruled correctly on all four of Hendricks’s claims.15 However,
the court would have been more persuasive in its ruling on negligent supervision
had it evaluated the claim based on the traditional eight-factor test used in
Wyoming for assessing the imposition of duty.16 Finally, this note will examine the
current state of Wyoming law regarding a plaintiff ’s claim for loss of consortium
of a sibling.17

BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court of Wyoming does not recognize a claim for negligent
supervision of minors.18 In causes of action for loss of consortium the court has
yet to address a plaintiff ’s right to recover for loss of consortium based on injuries
to a sibling. In premises liability actions, Wyoming treats trespassers as a distinct
group and applies the rule of “reasonable care under the circumstances” to all

10

)D at 684. John and Maureen Hurley purchased their home near Cheyenne, Wyoming in
2003. )D at 683. The home inspection done prior to the purchase indicated on its cover page that
the inspection did not include any features on the property outside of the actual residence. Brief of
Petitioner at 3, Hendricks v. Hurley, 184 P.3d 680 (Wyo. 2008) (No. S-007-0178). The Hurleys
had no work done on the well prior to the incident and the well head cover completely hid most of
the wire connections of the well. (ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 683–84.
11

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 684.

12

)D at 682.

13

)D at 681.

14

See infra notes 18–55 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes 56–166 and accompanying text.

16

See infra notes 105–42 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 143–53 and accompanying text.

18

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 685.
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other entrants.19 Finally, the court recognizes claims for negligent inﬂiction of
emotional distress (hereinafter “NIED”), but places limits on who can recover
and when.20

.EGLIGENT 3UPERVISION $UTY TO 3UPERVISE
In her ﬁrst claim, Hendricks argued the Hurleys had a duty to supervise
her son Ryan.21 Most jurisdictions, including Wyoming, do not hold a possessor
of land liable for failing to supervise the activities of minors.22 However, other
jurisdictions have addressed the issue of negligent supervision and have formally
recognized this tort.23 Some courts hold an occupier of land liable for injuries
to a child if the child’s guardian entrusts the occupier with the supervision of
that child and lack of supervision is the act of negligence causing the injury.24
While these authorities hold a person entrusted with the child’s supervision owes
a duty of reasonable care to keep the child safe, that duty does not extend to
unforeseeable circumstances.25

19

Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293, 295–96 (Wyo. 1993).

20

Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195–203 (Wyo. 1986).

21

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 685.

62 AM. JUR. 2D 0REMISES ,IABILITY § 263 (2008); (ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 685. The Supreme
Court of Wyoming has not addressed this issue. However, when deciding whether to impose a
common law duty upon a defendant under the theory of negligence, the court traditionally balances
eight factors. Daniels v. Carpenter, 62 P.3d 555, 563 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Duncan v. Afton, Inc.,
991 P.2d 739, 742 (Wyo. 1999) (citing ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 932 (Wyo.
1981))). The eight factors include the foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff; the closeness of
the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury; the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct; the policy
of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden upon the defendant; the consequences to the
community and the court system; and the availability; cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved. 'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196 (quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of U. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal.
1976)).
22

23
See, e.g., Daniel N. McPherson, -ISSOURI ,AW ON .EGLIGENT 3UPERVISION, 59 J. MO. B. 127,
127–29 (2003) (discussing requirements under Missouri law for negligent supervision claims);
A.R.H. v. W.H.S., 876 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d
43, 50 (Ariz. 1995); Bang v. Tran, 1997 Mass.App.Div. 122, 124 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div. 1997);
Gulledge v. Gulledge, 367 N.E.2d 429, 431 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1977); Busillo v. Hetzel, 374
N.E.2d 1090, 1091–92 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1978); Oakley v. State, 298 N.E.2d 120, 120 (N.Y.
1973).

See, e.g., 62 AM. JUR. 2D 0REMISES ,IABILITY § 263 (2008); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 81 (2008);
Barry v. Cantrell, 258 S.E.2d 61, 63–64 (Ga. 1979); Babula v. Robertson, 536 N.W.2d 834, 837–38
(Mich. 1995); Adolph E. by Susan E. v. Lori M., 166 A.D.2d 906, 906 (N.Y.A.D. 4th Dept. 1990).
24

25
See 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 81 (2008); Barrera v. Gen. Elec. Co., 378 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (holding when one, other than a parent, undertakes to control an infant, the
person becomes responsible for any injury proximately caused by his or her negligence; the person
is required to use reasonable care, measured by the reasonable person standard, to protect the infant
he or she has assumed temporary custody and control over).
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While a possessor of land is not responsible for supervising the activities of
minors on his or her property, the Supreme Court of Wyoming has held a driver
of an automobile liable for supervision over activities of minor passengers.26 In
$ELLAPENTA V $ELLAPENTA, the court held parents have a duty to buckle the seatbelts
of their minor passengers who depend on adult care and supervision for their
well-being and safety.27 The court, however, clearly limited its holding to the facts
of that case and stated the ruling did not create a general duty of supervision.28

Loss of Consortium
The basis of Hendricks’s second claim, loss of consortium, is the recognition
of a legally protected interest in personal relationships and the effects negligent or
intentional acts of others may have beyond those suffered by the injured party.29
The claim recognizes loss of the comfort, society, and companionship of an injured
person with the appropriate relationship to the plaintiff.30 In Wyoming, a claim
for loss of consortium is derivative of the injured party’s claim; therefore, the loss
of consortium claim must fail if the injured party’s underlying claim fails.31 The
Supreme Court of Wyoming allows recovery for the loss of a spouse’s consortium
and the loss of a parent’s consortium.32 However, the court does not allow parental
claims for loss of a child’s consortium and has not addressed a claim for loss of
consortium based on the death or injuries inﬂicted on a plaintiff ’s sibling.33
With respect to a plaintiff ’s right of recovery for damages resulting from
the loss of his or her sibling’s consortium, only ﬁve jurisdictions recognize this
claim and six courts expressly hold the siblings of a deceased child cannot recover
under this claim.34 The Supreme Court of Wyoming, along with many other
jurisdictions, has yet to address this issue.

26

Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Wyo. 1992).

27

)D

28

)D at 1158–59.

29

See 24 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 427 § 1 (2008).

30

Hannifan v. Am. Nat. Bank of Cheyenne, 185 P.3d 679, 681 (Wyo. 2008).

31

Worman v. Carver, 44 P.3d 82, 89 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Massengill v. S.M.A.R.T. Sports
Med. Clinic, PC, 996 P.2d 1132, 1137(Wyo. 2000)).
32

Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Wyo. 1986) (holding both husbands and wives
may recover for loss of a spouse’s consortium); Nulle v. Gillete–Campbell Co. Jt. Powers Fire Bd.,
797 P.2d 1171, 1175 (Wyo. 1990) (holding a child may recover for loss of consortium of a parent).
33

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 201.

34

See Elizabeth Trainor, Annotation, 7HO /THER 4HAN 0ARENT -AY 2ECOVER FOR ,OSS OF
#ONSORTIUM ON $EATH OF -INOR #HILD, 84 A.L.R. 5TH 687 (2000). The following cases recognize the
claim: In re Estate of Finley, 601 N.E.2d 699 (Ill. 1992); In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans,
La., 795 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Louisiana law); Thornton v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
287 So. 2d 262 (Miss. 1973); Leavy v. Yates, 142 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Complaint of
Patton-Tully Transp. Co., 797 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1986). The following cases expressly disallow the
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0REMISES ,IABILITY
For Hendricks’s third claim based on premises liability, the traditional
common law duty of care an occupant of real property owes a person injured
on his or her premises depends upon the legal status of the entrant at the time
of the accident.35 In #LARKE V "ECKWITH, the Supreme Court of Wyoming altered
premises liability law in Wyoming and chose to treat trespassers as a distinct
group, but adopted the rule of “reasonable care under the circumstances” for all
other entrants.36 In articulating the new rule, it held the possessor of land must act
reasonably in maintaining his or her property in a safe condition in light of all of
the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury, the seriousness of the injury,
and the burden of avoiding the risk.37 The court indicated the foreseeability of the
injury, rather than the traditional status of the lawful entrant, is now the basis for
premises liability in Wyoming.38
In 'OODRICH V 3EAMANDS, the court held a possessor of land liable if he or
she has reason to know a dangerous condition exists.39 The court held a person
has “reason to know” when that person has information from which someone of
reasonable intelligence, or by his own superior intelligence, would infer a certain
condition exists and realize the condition involves an unreasonable risk of harm.40
More than ten years later, in ,ANDSIEDEL V "UFFALO 0ROPERTIES ,,#, the court again
addressed the issue of premises liability and, when prompted by the plaintiff,
expressly refused to impose upon occupants the duty to inspect their property.41

claim: Solomon v. Harman, 489 P.2d 236 (Ariz. 1971); Scalise v. Bristol Hosp., 1995 WL 410751
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1995); Clark v. Jones, 658 P.2d 1147 (Okla. 1983); Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967
S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1998); In Long v. Dugan, 788 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1990); Bell v. City of Milwaukee,
746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
35

Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, -ODERN 3TATUS OF 2ULES #ONDITIONING ,ANDOWNERS ,IABILITY
UPON 3TATUS OF )NJURED 0ARTY AS )NVITEE ,ICENSEE OR 4RESPASSER, 22 A.L.R. 4TH 294 § 2(a) (1983). The
categories of entrants include trespassers, licensees, and invitees. )D
36

#LARKE, 858 P.2d at 296.

37

)D

38

)D

39 870 P.2d 1061, 1064–65 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353
(1965)). In the 'OODRICH case, a patron ﬁled a negligence suit against a vendor for failing to discover,
disclose, and warn of a latent defect in the construction of a ceiling and ceiling fan when the ceiling
tiles and fan fell on her, causing injury. )D. at 1062.
40

)D at 1064–65 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 12(1) (1965)).

41

112 P.3d 610 (Wyo. 2005). The plaintiff offered a jury instruction imposing on the
premises owners an explicit duty to inspect. )D at 615. The plaintiff argued the court should adopt
the Restatement Second of Torts, as the court recognized essentially the same rule in previous
cases. )D The court noted the instruction offered by the plaintiff went much further than the rule
recognized in the previous cases or the Restatement because it imposed an express duty to inspect.
)D
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.EGLIGENT )NmICTION OF %MOTIONAL $ISTRESS
Hendricks’s fourth claim, negligent inﬂiction of emotional distress (“NIED”),
allows a claimant to recover for emotional damages after witnessing a tragic
accident in which someone known to the plaintiff is seriously injured or killed.42
The plaintiff must show he or she has the requisite relationship to the injured
party, and that he or she observed the inﬂiction of serious bodily harm or death,
or its immediate aftermath, without material change in the condition or location
of the victim.43 A claimant must also prove the defendant’s negligence and that his
or her negligence proximately caused the plaintiff ’s mental injuries.44
Traditionally, states have required the plaintiff to show actual or threatened
physical impact in conjunction with the emotional harm suffered.45 In 'ATES V
2ICHARDSON, the seminal NIED case in Wyoming, the court recognized a negligent
defendant’s liability for purely emotional damages.46 While not requiring a
showing or threat of physical impact makes the court slightly liberal in its
requirements for damages in these cases, the court limited a plaintiff ’s ability
to claim he or she observed the immediate aftermath of the injury or death in
#ONTRERAS "Y AND 4HROUGH #ONTRERAS V #ARBON #OUNTY 3CHOOL $ISTRICT  .47 In that
case, the Wyoming Supreme Court articulated the “immediacy test,” applying
it to all situations in which a plaintiff does not actually observe the accident.48
Under this test, the court allowed some time to exist between the moment of
injury and the time at which the plaintiff observed the victim.49 However, once
the victim’s condition or location materially changes, the “moment of crisis” is
over, regardless of how little time passed between the accident and the plaintiff ’s
observation.50 The court also held that a plaintiff may not recover for NIED if he
or she does not see the victim until after the victim is in a hospital.51

42

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 686 (citing 'ATES, 719 P.2d at 199).

43

)D

44

)D (citing 'ATES, 719 P.2d at 201).

45

Larsen v. Banner Health Sys., 81 P.3d 196, 199 (Wyo. 2003) (citing 'ATES 719 P.2d at 195)
(citing W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 54, at 362–64 (5th ed. 1984)).
46
'ATES, 719 P.2d at 198. In 'ATES, plaintiff brought an action for negligent inﬂiction of
emotional distress following an accident in which an automobile collided with a bicycle ridden by
a child. )D at 193. The Supreme Court of Wyoming held a plaintiff could recover under an NIED
claim if he or she observed the inﬂiction of serious bodily harm or death, or if he or she observed
the harm shortly after its occurrence, but without material change in the condition or location of
the victim. )D at 199.
47

843 P.2d 589, 593 (Wyo. 1992).

48

)D

49

)D

50

)D

51

)D at 594.
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In sum, the Supreme Court of Wyoming does not recognize a general duty
to supervise minors, though regular negligence principles still apply.52 Wyoming
does recognize derivative claims of loss of consortium for spouses and children;
however, the court does not recognize a parent’s claim and has yet to address
whether plaintiffs can recover for loss of consortium for an injured sibling.53
Wyoming does not recognize a duty to inspect one’s premises, though the law
imposes a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances when entrants are
licensees and invitees.54 Finally, Wyoming does recognize the tort of negligent
inﬂiction of emotional distress and allows recovery for purely emotional damages;
however, the court places speciﬁc limitations on when a plaintiff can recover.55

PRINCIPAL CASE
After Ryan Hendricks’s electrocution by an improperly wired well head at
his grandparents’ home, his mother, Linda Hendricks, asserted multiple claims
against the Hurleys.56 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Wyoming
afﬁrmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Hurleys
for all of Hendricks’s claims.57

Negligent Supervision
For her negligent supervision claim, Hendricks argued Wyoming recognizes
a general common law duty to supervise minors.58 In advancing this argument,
Hendricks used $ANIELS V #ARPENTER to support her claim that the court must
decide whether a duty exists, and a duty will exist under the theory of negligence
when society says it should exist.59
The $ANIELS court held that when deciding whether to impose a common
law duty on a defendant under the theory of negligence, the court must balance
eight factors.60 In her brief, Hendricks analyzed each of the eight factors as they
52

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 685.

53

See Weaver, 715 P.2d at 1361; 'ATES, 219 P.2d at 201.

54

#LARKE, 858 P.2d at 295.

55

'ATES, 719 P.2d 193.

56

Hendricks v. Hurley, 184 P.3d 680, 681 (Wyo. 2008).

57

)D

58

)D at 684.

59

Daniels v. Carpenter, 62 P.3d 555, 563 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991
P.2d 739, 742 (Wyo. 1999) (citing ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 932 (Wyo. 1981))).
60
$ANIELS, 62 P.3d at 563. When analyzing whether to impose a duty under common law
for the purpose of a negligence claim, the court balances eight factors ﬁrst recognized in 'ATES V
2ICHARDSON: (1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection between
the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, (5) the policy of preventing future
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pertained to this case and concluded the defendants had a duty to supervise the
child and a jury should have determined whether there was a breach of that duty.61
In advancing her argument, Hendricks cited $ELLAPENTA V $ELLAPENTA, in
which the court held parents have a duty to buckle the seatbelts of their minor
passengers who depend on adult care and supervision for their well-being and
safety.62 Hendricks argued $ELLAPENTA imposed a duty similar to the one she
asserted and she argued there must be some signiﬁcance in the $ELLEPENTA court
directly quoting a New Jersey case recognizing negligent supervision.63
The court, however, held Hendricks’s interpretation of $ANIELS and $ELLAPENTA
incorrect.64 First, the court indicated the $ANIELS court upheld the dismissal of a
claim for negligent supervision against property possessors by applying what the
(ENDRICKS court called “the usual test for imposition of a duty under common
law negligence.”65 This test imposes a duty of reasonable care to avoid injury only
where it is reasonably foreseeable a failure to use such care might result in injury.66
The $ANIELS court held an allegation to supervise minors, without more, cannot
establish a duty.67
Second, the court distinguished $ELLAPENTA by asserting the $ELLEPENTA court
clearly limited its holding to the facts of that case and in no way created a general
common law duty of supervision.68 As the (ENDRICKS court noted, it based its
decisions in both $ANIELS and $ELLAPENTA on the foreseeability of the danger to
victims, not a general duty to supervise.69 Since no general duty to supervise exists
in Wyoming the court afﬁrmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in
the Hurleys’ favor.70

harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) the consequences to the community and
the court system, and (8) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. )D
at 563 (citing 'ATES 719 P.2d at 196 (quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of U. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342
(Cal. 1976))).
61

Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 20–23.

62

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 685 (quoting Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Wyo.

1992)).
63

Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 22 (citing Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145, 1152 (N.J.

1983)).
64

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 685.

65

)D (citing $ANIELS, 62 P.3d at 563).

66

)D

67

)D at 685 (quoting $ANIELS, 62 P.3d at 564).

68

)D The $ELLAPENTA court stated it only imposed a duty on parents to buckle their minor
children’s seat belts after an extensive showing that national and state statistics make serious injury
or death a foreseeable result of not wearing a seat belt. $ELLAPENTA, 838 P.2d at 1158–59.
69

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 685.

70

)D
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Loss of Consortium
Hendricks next asserted a claim for loss of consortium on behalf of Ryan’s
siblings.71 The court held that if the injured party fails to establish the defendant’s
liability for his or her claim, the loss of consortium claim must fail also.72 Hendricks
could not establish the Hurleys’ liability for Ryan’s underlying negligence claim,
and therefore, the district court dismissed the claim for loss of consortium and the
Supreme Court of Wyoming afﬁrmed.73

0REMISES ,IABILITY
Hendricks’s third claim regarding premises liability contained two
arguments.74 First, Hendricks argued the defendants, as homeowners and
possessors of the premises, had a duty to inspect their property to ensure its
safety.75 Next, Hendricks argued the Hurleys breached their duty of reasonable
care under the circumstances because evidence indicated the well and hydrant
created an unsafe condition.76 That evidence, she argued, consisted of the close
proximity of the water hydrant and the well pedestal, the polarity of the electrical
system, and visible electrical connections.77 Hendricks noted that although the
Hurleys believed their home inspection when purchasing the home included the
well, the inspection report indicated otherwise.78
In response, the court found a possessor of land has an afﬁrmative duty to
protect visitors against dangers known to him and dangers discoverable with the
exercise of reasonable care, but must only use ordinary care to keep the premises
in a safe condition.79 The court ruled that the evidence presented regarding the
well and hydrant, wiring issues, and the inspection report, when viewed in the

71

)D at 681.

72

)D

73

)D at 687; see infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s evaluation
of Hendricks’s underlying negligence claim).
74

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 687.

75

Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 12. However, as the court pointed out, a 2005 decision
already held a duty to inspect one’s premises does not exist in Wyoming. (ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 682
(citing Landsiedel v. Buffalo Prop., LLC, 112 P.3d 610, 615 (Wyo. 2005)).
76

Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 12.

77

)D at 17.

78

)D

79

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 683 (citing Rhoades v. K-Mart Corp., 863 P.2d 626 (Wyo. 1993)).
The court uses the term “ordinary care” in the (ENDRICKS opinion; however, it uses the term
“reasonable care under the circumstances” in other rulings. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying
text (stating the usual test for imposing liability on possessors of land when the occupant is a licensee
or invitee is reasonable care under the circumstances).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2009

9

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 9 [2009], No. 2, Art. 12

686

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9

light most favorable to Hendricks, could not establish the Hurleys knew or should
have known of any problems with the well wiring before Ryan’s injury.80
The Hurleys had a duty to investigate the well for problems only if they
knew the well created a dangerous condition or would have discovered the danger
with the exercise of reasonable care.81 Hendricks could not offer any facts from
which a jury could ﬁnd the Hurleys had actual or constructive knowledge of
the defects.82 As the defense noted, the court concluded general or conclusory
allegations cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact.83

.EGLIGENT )NmICTION OF %MOTIONAL $ISTRESS
In Hendricks’s ﬁnal claim, she argued she became a witness to her son’s death
under the requirements for NIED when her husband called from the scene of
the accident and described the events to her as medical personnel attempted to
revive their son.84 As the court noted, Hendricks did not observe the inﬂiction
of her son’s injuries or the immediate aftermath without material change in his
condition or location.85 In fact, she did not see him until he was already in the
hospital.86 Wyoming law clearly states a plaintiff cannot recover for NIED if he or
she does not see the victim until after the victim arrives at a hospital.87

80
(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 683. The court noted the home inspector’s report, explicitly
excluding the well, would not put a reasonable person on notice that the well presented a dangerous
condition. )D at 683–84. In addition, it took a professional inspection done after the accident to
actually identify the issues with the well. )D at 684. The court also clariﬁed that, in Wyoming, an
installer’s possible knowledge of defects does not mean A REASONABLE PERSON IN THE OCCUPANTS POSITION
should know of the defect. )D at 684 (citing Goodrich v. Seamands, 870 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Wyo.
1994)) (emphasis added). Therefore, the Hurleys were not liable for damages even if Hendricks
could prove the original installers of the well knew of its improper installation. )D
81

)D. at 683–84.

82

)D at 684. Hendricks presented evidence consisting of her own assertions regarding the
position of the well and pedestal, the polarity of the electrical systems, and the existence of electric
connections in the vicinity. )D
83

Brief of Respondent at 8, Hendricks v. Hurley, 184 P.3d 680 (Wyo. 2008) (No. S-0070178) (citing Jones v. Schabron, 113 P.3d 34, 40 (Wyo. 2005)).
84
(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 685. The claim of NIED allows a parent, spouse, child or sibling
to bring forth a claim if he or she observes the inﬂiction of serious bodily harm or death, or its
immediate aftermath, without material change in the condition or location of the victim. )D at 686
(citing 'ATES, 719 P.2d at 199).
85

)D at 686.

86

)D

87

Contreras By & Through Contreras v. Carbon Co. Sch. Dist. # 1, 843 P.2d 589, 593 (Wyo.

1992).
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Hendricks also argued the exception to the general rule requiring observation
of the immediate aftermath of the injury, as recognized in ,ARSEN V "ANNER (EALTH
System, should have applied in her case.88 The Larsen court introduced what it
characterized as an “extremely limited” exception.89 It held that in the limited
circumstances where a person breaches a contractual relationship for services that
carry with them deeply emotional responses, a duty arises to exercise ordinary
care to avoid causing emotional harm.90 In the case at hand, Hendricks did not
claim or attempt to prove a contractual relationship existed between her and the
defendants.91
In sum, the court upheld the district court’s summary judgment order on
all counts because Linda Hendricks could not establish the Hurleys’ negligence
as premises owners or in supervising her son.92 The ﬁre hydrant and well
casing pedestal proximity and the visible electrical connections nearby did not
demonstrate the Hurleys had information from which they could infer existence
of a dangerous condition.93 The court precluded liability for the remaining loss of
consortium claim because the law bases liability for this claim on the defendant’s
negligence, which Hendricks failed to establish.94

ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court of Wyoming properly afﬁrmed the grant of summary
judgment on Hendricks’s negligent supervision, loss of consortium, negligent
inspection of premises, and negligent inﬂiction of emotional distress claims.95
However, the court would have been more persuasive had it evaluated the negligent
supervision claim based on the traditional eight-factor test used in Wyoming for
assessing the imposition of a duty.96 In addition, while the court chose not to

88
(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 686. In Larsen, a hospital switched two babies at birth and one of the
mothers and her daughter discovered the switch forty-three years later. Larsen, 81 P.3d at 198. The
mother and daughter sued the hospital for purely emotional damages stemming from its negligence.
)D
89

Larsen, 81 P.3d at 206.

90

)D (emphasis added).

91

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 686. Hendricks also cited other jurisdictions allowing an exception
to the general NIED rule where the nature of the relationship between the parties gives rise to a
duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid causing emotional harm. )D (quoting Lawrence, 534 N.W.2d
at 421 (holding a client cannot recover for emotional distress resulting from negligence of the
defendant without showing physical injury)). The court denied this expansion and refused to extend
the exception recognized in Larsen. )D.
92

)D at 683–84.

93

)D

94

)D at 687.

95

See infra notes 99–166 and accompanying text.

96

See infra notes 105–42 and accompanying text.
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address the issue of whether a child can claim loss of consortium for a sibling
under Wyoming law, previous case law suggests the court may reject this claim if
presented with the issue in the future.97 Finally, the court properly afﬁrmed the
dismissal of Hendricks’s premises liability and NIED claim, as Wyoming does not
recognize a duty to inspect one’s premises and Hendricks did not witness her son’s
injuries or their immediate aftermath.98

Negligent Supervision
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has not recognized a claim for negligent
supervision of a minor. Even though other jurisdictions have addressed and
recognized this claim, those courts noted the duty is narrow and hinges on whether
a reasonable person would have foreseen the type of injury that occurred and taken
precautions to avoid such injury.99 While the (Second and Third) Restatements
of Torts recognize special relationships as imposing a duty to aid or protect, the
duty only includes the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances.100 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts speciﬁcally states the defendant is not liable if he
neither knows nor should know of an unreasonable risk.101
In addition, Hendricks sought to extend the duty of supervision to someone
outside of the child’s immediate family (his grandparents).102 This gave her
argument less validity because courts are reluctant to recognize family membership
as creating a special relationship carrying with it a heightened standard of care.103
97

See infra notes 143–53 and accompanying text.

98

See infra notes 154–66 and accompanying text.

99

See McPherson, supra note 23, at 127–29 (stating the duty to supervise has been said to
be a narrow one (citing Hill v. Herbert Hoover Boys Club, 990 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Mo. App. E.D.
1999))); Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43, 46–47 (Ariz. 1995) (stating the pertinent inquiry is
whether parent acted as reasonable and prudent parent with respect to act or omission that injured
his child); Bang v. Tran, 1997 Mass. App. Div. 122, 127 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div.) (stating the
test is what an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent would have done in similar circumstances);
A.R.H. v. W.H.S., 876 S.W. 2d 687, 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding the duty to supervise is a
narrow one and breach turns upon whether a reasonable person would recognize that an incident of
the type alleged could occur and that steps should be taken to prevent it. Also, that more vigilance
and caution may be required when a child is involved if there is a potentially dangerous condition of
which the supervisor is or should be aware); Barrera v. Gen. Elec. Co., 378 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1975) (holding when one, other than parent, undertakes to control infant, such person
becomes responsible for any injury proximately caused by his negligence; such person is required to
use reasonable care, as measured by reasonable man standard, to protect infant over whom he has
assumed temporary custody and control).
100
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
PHYS. HARM § 41 (P.F.D. No. 1, 2005).
101

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. e (1965).

102

Hendricks v. Hurley, 184 P.3d 608, 685 (Wyo. 2008).

OF

TORTS: LIAB.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYS. HARM § 40 Reporter’s Notes cmt. o (Tentative
Draft No. 5, 2007) (citing Chastain v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 275 S.E.2d 679 (Ga.Ct.App.1980)).
103
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Beyond cases discussing a child’s ability to bring a negligent supervision claim
against his or her parents, almost no judicial consideration of afﬁrmative duties of
other family members to each other exists.104
In analyzing the issue of whether to impose a duty upon a defendant at
common law, the Supreme Court of Wyoming has said duty is an expression of
those policy considerations which lead the law to declare the plaintiff is entitled
to protection.105 In Wyoming, when the court considers whether to impose a
duty based on a particular relationship, the traditional eight-factor test adopted
by the court in 'ATES V 2ICHARDSON encompasses the various policy considerations
the court balances.106 This test applies to cases involving premises liability.107 The
Supreme Court of Wyoming has ruled the eight-factor test does not require the
existence of a relationship recognized under some specialized theory of law, such
as premises liability agency.108
The (ENDRICKS court would have been more persuasive had it applied the
eight-factor test in discussing the issue of negligent supervision because the
court consistently turns to this test when assessing the imposition of duty.109 The
(ENDRICKS court actually cited and discussed several cases in its opinion in which
the court applied the traditional eight-factor test.110 However, the court avoided
the eight-factor analysis by proclaiming the “usual test” for imposition of a duty in
these circumstances is that of reasonable care to avoid injury where it is reasonably
foreseeable a failure to use such care may result in injury.111

104

)D

105

Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 744–45 (Wyo. 1999); accord, e.g., Natrona County
v. Blake, 81 P.3d 948, 951 (Wyo. 2003); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo. 1986).
106

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196 (adopting the eight-factor test in Wyoming) (quoting Tarasoff v.
Regents of U. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976)); accord, e.g., Black v. William Insulation
Co., 141 P.3d 123, 128 (Wyo. 2006) (stating the court uses the factors adopted in 'ATES when
deciding whether to adopt a particular tort duty); Killian v. Caza Drilling, Inc., 131 P.3d 975, 980
(Wyo. 2006) (stating the court uses the factors adopted in 'ATES when deciding whether to adopt
a particular tort duty); Erpelding v. Lisek, 71 P.3d 754, 758 (Wyo. 2003) (stating, since 'ATES the
court utilizes the eight-factor test which balances factors to determine whether a defendant should
owe a duty of care to a plaintiff ); Anderson v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 49 P.3d 1011, 1025 (Wyo.
2002) (stating in order to conclude the scope encompasses the defendant’s actions, the court must
consider the factors adopted in 'ATES); $UNCAN, 991 P.2d at 744 (listing the factors in 'ATES when
holding it balances numerous factors in considering the imposition of duty based on a particular
relationship); Mostert v. CLB & Assocs., 741 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wyo. 1987) (following the factors
adopted in 'ATES).
107

Daniels v. Carpenter, 62 P.3d 555, 563 (Wyo. 2003).

108

)D.

109

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196.

110

See $ANIELS, 62 P.3d at 563 (citing $UNCAN, 991 P.2d at 739; 'OODRICH, 870 P.2d 1061;
Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199 (Wyo. 1995)).
111

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 684 (citing $ANIELS, 62 P.3d at 563).
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!PPLICATION OF THE 4RADITIONAL %IGHT &ACTOR 4EST TO THE &ACTS IN
Hendricks v. Hurley
The (ENDRICKS court found Ryan Hendricks’s injury not reasonably
foreseeable.112 While the traditional 'ATES test includes foreseeability, it is just one
factor among many to be weighed and is not the most important factor.113 The
second factor the court considers in evaluating whether to impose a duty upon a
defendant is the closeness of connection between the defendant’s conduct and the
plaintiff ’s injury.114 The closer the connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the plaintiff ’s injury, the more this factor supports imposing a duty on the
defendant.115 In addressing the closeness of connection between the Hurleys’
conduct and Ryan’s injury, the court may have found the connection too tenuous
because Ryan’s injury did not result from a directly injurious action, but from the
Hurleys’ failure to inspect for and repair a latent defect, the danger of which they
had no reason to know.116
The third factor the court should have considered is the certainty of injury
to the plaintiff.117 If injury to the plaintiff is uncertain or the claim is possibly
disingenuous, this factor weighs against imposing a duty on the defendant.118 The
degree of certainty that Ryan suffered injury is not at issue in this case, as he died
from his injuries inﬂicted on the Hurleys’ land.119
The fourth factor the court should have analyzed is the moral blame attached
to the defendant’s conduct.120 Moral blame arising out of the defendant’s actions
supports a ﬁnding that the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff.121 If the
defendant had direct control over establishing and ensuring proper procedures to
avoid the harm or when the defendant is in the best position to prevent injury,
the court deems him or her morally blameworthy.122 In this case, the Hurleys were
not blameworthy, as the well presented a latent danger and there is no evidence

112

)D at 683.

113

$UNCAN, 991 P.2d at 745. The court has recognized the policy of preventing future harm as
one of the most important factors in the eight-factor test. )D
114

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196.

115

See Andersen, 49 P.3d at 1025; $UNCAN, 991 P.2d at 745.

116

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 683–84.

117

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196.

118

3EE +ILLIAN, 131 P.3d at 986; Larsen, 81 P.3d at 205; 'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196–97.

119

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 681.

120

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196.

121

See +ILLIAN, 131 P.3d at 986; %RPELDING, 71 P.3d at 759; Larsen, 81 P.3d at 205; $UNCAN, 991
P.2d at 745.
122

+ILLIAN, 131 P.3d at 986; Larsen, 81 P.3d at 205; SEE $UNCAN, 991 P.2d at 745.
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showing harm could have been prevented if the Hurleys directly supervised Ryan
in the yard or if he received more immediate medical assistance.123
The ﬁfth factor the court should have considered is the policy of preventing
future harm.124 If placing a duty upon a defendant in a certain situation will
succeed in preventing future harm, this factor will strongly support imposing a
duty upon the defendant.125 The court has recognized the policy of preventing
future harm as one of the most important factors in the eight-factor test.126 In
this case, imposing a duty of supervision upon the defendants cannot prevent
future harm, as the Hurleys’ were unaware of the danger posed by the well, and
no evidence exists to show how increased supervision could have prevented the
injury.127
The sixth factor the court should have examined is the burden a duty places
on the defendant.128 If the burden on the defendant is not signiﬁcant, this factor
supports ﬁnding a duty.129 If a duty were imposed in this case, the burden would be
signiﬁcant because it holds supervisors liable even when harm is unforeseeable. A
supervisor should not be forced to keep a constant vigil over his or her supervisees
and prevent injury from risks the supervisor has no reason to know exist.130
The seventh factor the court should have considered is the impact the
imposition of a duty would have on the community and the court system.131 This
factor considers the burdens associated with creating a new cause of action and
the increase of litigation in courts.132 If the burden on the community and the
court system is insigniﬁcant, this factor supports ﬁnding a duty on behalf of the
defendant.133
123

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 683, 685.

124

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196.

125

See Larsen, 81 P.3d at 205; $UNCAN, 991 P.2d at 745.

126

$UNCAN, 991 P.2d at 745.

127

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 683–85. In addition, no medical evidence existed to prove that
a faster response time on behalf of the Hurleys could have prevented Ryan Hendricks’s injury or
death. )D at 685.
128

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196.

129

See Larsen, 81 P.3d at 205; $UNCAN, 991 P.2d at 745; 'ATES, 719 P.2d at 197.

130

See, e.g., Smith, Etc. v. Archbishop of St. Louis, 632 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Mo. App. E.D.
1982) (stating the duty to supervise is narrow, the defendant is not an insurer of plaintiff ’s safety,
and is not required to maintain a “constant vigil” over every person under their supervision);
Stewart v. Harvard, 520 S.E.2d 752, 759 (Ga. 1999) (holding the person caring for a child is not
an “insurer of the safety of the child. He is required only to use reasonable care commensurate with
the reasonably foreseeable risk of harm.” (quoting Hemphill v. Johnson, 497 S.E.2d 16, 18 (Ga.
1998))).
131

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 196.

132

Larsen, 81 P.3d at 205; $UNCAN, 991 P.2d at 746.

133

See Larsen, 81 P.3d at 206; %RPELDING, 71 P.3d at 760; $UNCAN, 991 P.2d at 746.
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Recognizing a duty to supervise may increase litigation, as a court subjects
itself to increased litigation any time it recognizes a new cause of action.134
However, as the Supreme Court of Wyoming recognized in 'ATES, an increased
chance of litigation should not deter a court from recognizing a duty that allows
an innocent plaintiff to recover for a loss suffered.135 The court, in imposing a
duty under a cause of action for NIED stated, “[i]f the only purpose of our law
was to unburden the court system, then we would reach the zenith of judicial
achievement simply by closing the district courts to all litigants and allowing
all wrongs to come to rest on innocent victims.”136 Hence, this factor is not
necessarily in the Hurley’s favor.
The ﬁnal factor the court should have examined in evaluating whether to
impose a duty on a defendant is the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance
for the risk involved.137 If an insurance policy is available to the defendant for the
type of risk and is not unreasonably expensive, the factor may support ﬁnding a
duty.138 However, the court rejected insurance arguments as a basis for denying
recovery in 'ATES V 2ICHARDSON, ruling a person’s liability under law should not
change according the availability and cost of liability insurance.139
In summary, the Supreme Court of Wyoming considers the sum total of the
above factors when analyzing whether to impose a duty upon a defendant at
common law.140 In the present case, the total number of factors against establishing
134
Theama by Bichler v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 521 (Wis. 1984) (“The fear of
an increase in litigation has been voiced in almost every instance where the courts have been asked
to recognize a new cause of action. . . . As a result, we feel that this argument does not merit any
weight.”); see also Note, 4HE #HILDS 2IGHT TO 3UE FOR ,OSS OF A 0ARENTS ,OVE #ARE AND #OMPANIONSHIP
#AUSED BY 4ORTIOUS )NJURY TO THE 0ARENT, 56 B.U. L. REV. 722, 732 (1976).
135
'ATES, 719 P.2d at 197; see also Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d 1013, 1022 (Wyo. 2002) (stating the
court again will reject arguments to effectively close the courts to a class of plaintiffs); Leithead
v. Am. Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1065 (Wyo. 1986) (stating while problems in recognizing a
new claim are not to be dismissed lightly, they can be solved without rejecting the action entirely).
Rejecting the claim entirely would be the equivalent of “employing a cannon to kill a ﬂea.” Leithead,
721 P.2d at 1065 (quoting 'ATES, 719 P.2d at 197 (quoting Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 79
(1978))).
136

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 197.

137

)D at 196.

138

See Larsen, 81 P.3d at 206. Conﬂict exists as to whether claims for negligent supervision
fall within the coverage of insurance policies. McPherson, supra note 23, at 131–33. Therefore, this
factor may weigh in favor of the Hurleys, as the Restatement (Third) of Torts notes the unavailability
of liability insurance in this area. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYS. HARM § 40 Reporter’s
Notes cmt. o (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (speculating that the unavailability of liability insurance
may be inhibiting the doctrinal development in this area).
139

3EE 'ATES, 719 P.2d at 197 (“A person’s liability in our law still remains the same whether or
not he has liability insurance; properly, the provision and cost of such insurance varies with potential
liability under the law, not the law with the cost of insurance.”).
140

$UNCAN, 991 P.2d at 746; accord, e.g., Natrona County, 81 P.3d at 951; 'ATES, 719 P.2d at

196.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol9/iss2/12

16

Murphy: Tort Law - What Happened to Duty in Wyoming - Negligent Supervisi

CASE NOTE

2009

693

a duty, as well as the comparative weight of the factors against establishing a duty,
indicates the court should not impose a duty upon the Hurleys for negligent
supervision of their grandson.141 A thorough analysis of these factors by the
(ENDRICKS court would have bolstered the court’s ruling, as the court consistently
turns to this test when assessing the imposition of duty upon a defendant.142

Loss of Consortium
The court correctly upheld the dismissal of Hendricks’s second claim, loss of
consortium on behalf of Ryan’s siblings, because Hendricks failed to prove the
underlying claim of negligence, and Wyoming has not recognized a claim of loss
of a sibling’s consortium.143 By asserting the loss of consortium claim on behalf
of Ryan’s siblings, Hendricks argued for an extension of the current law, which
only recognizes claims for spouses or children who suffer the loss of a parent’s
consortium.144 The court declined to address the issue and instead based its ruling
on Hendricks’s failure to prove the underlying claim of negligence.145
Recent case law suggests a possible trend toward courts accepting this theory
of recovery for persons other than parents and spouses.146 The courts allowing
recovery for this claim reject arguments suggesting there can be no “special
relationship” between siblings or losses of this type are intangible and too
speculative.147 However, the majority of courts around the country either refuse
to address the issue or deny recovery for this cause of action.148
Courts expressly disallowing this claim hold the governing wrongful death
statutes preclude sibling recovery, the injuries in these cases are impermissibly
speculative, or the relationship between siblings differs from relationships between
spouses or parents and children in ways that preclude recovery.149 The argument
centered on the differing relationships among spouses, parents, and siblings is
most valid as to why the Wyoming Supreme Court should not recognize this

141

See supra notes 112–39 and accompanying text.

142

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.

143

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.2d at 683–84; see supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text.

144

Brief of Respondent, supra note 83, at 17–18.

145

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 687.

146

Trainor, supra note 34, Summary.

147

)D § 4(a) (citing In re Estate of Finley, 601 N.E.2d 699 (1992); Sheahan v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l
Commuter R.R. Corp., 496 N.E.2d 1179, 1182 (Ill. 1986)).
148

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

149

See Trainor, supra note 34, § 4(b) (citing Scalise v. Bristol Hosp., 1995 WL 410751 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1995) (not reported); Solomon v. Harman, 489 P.2d 236 (Ariz. 1971); Sheahan, 496
N.E.2d at 1182).
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claim in Wyoming.150 The law generally does not impose the same duty of care and
socially expected companionship on sibling relationships that is does on spousal
and parent-child relationships.151 The Supreme Court of Wyoming afﬁrmed this
in .ULLE V 'ILLETTEn#AMPBELL #OUNTY *OINT 0OWERS &IRE "OARD, when it recognized a
child’s claim for loss of a parent’s consortium and held a child’s relational interest
with a parent is one of unique dependence.152 In contrast, sibling relationships are
not characterized by any unique dependencies, such as the need for socialization
or ﬁnancial dependence.153

0REMISES ,IABILITY
With respect to Hendricks’s third claim, negligent failure to inspect, Wyoming
does not recognize a general duty to inspect one’s premises and Hendricks failed
to present evidence showing a reasonable person would foresee the well presenting
a dangerous condition.154 The Supreme Court of Wyoming ruled correctly on this
issue because an occupant should not have the duty to scour or comb through his
premises.155
When the possessor of land has no knowledge of a defect, and nothing in
the appearance or character of the premises indicates the existence of a defect,
no reason for an inspection exists and ordinary diligence does not require an
inspection prior to a person entering upon the land.156 To hold differently would

150

Wyoming’s wrongful death statute allows siblings to recover for a child’s death; therefore
one could not argue loss of a sibling’s consortium is limited by the wrongful death law’s failure to
recognize this relationship. Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1062 (Wyo. 1984). Also, the mental
and emotional injuries associated with the injury or death of a sibling are arguably not speculative.
See Hopson v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 408 A.2d 260, 264 (Conn. 1979) (“Although disparagingly referred
to as ‘sentimental’ or ‘parasitic’ damages, the mental and emotional anguish caused by seeing a
healthy, loving, companionable mate turn into a shell of a person is undeniably a real injury.”).
151
See Trainor, supra note 34, § 4(b) (citing Scalise, 1995 WL 410751 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995)
(not reported)); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 465–66 (Tex. 1990) (stating the distinction
between the parent-child relationship and the relationship between a child and other relatives is
rational and easily applied); Trainor, supra note 34, § 2(b) (stating the loss between siblings is often
characterized in terms of companionship as opposed to dependency).
152

797 P.2d 1171, 1175 (Wyo. 1990).

153

2EAGAN, 804 S.W.2d at 466 (“While . . . all family members enjoy a mutual interest in
consortium, the parent-child relationship is undeniably unique and the wellspring from which other
family relationships derive.”) (quoting Villareal v. State, 774 P.2d 213, 217 (Ariz. 1989)).
154

#LARKE, 858 P.2d at 295; (ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 684.

155

Parks v. Rogers, 825 A.2d 1128, 1131 (N.J. 2003).

156

Sisson v. Elliot, 628 S.E.2d 232, 234 (Ga. 2006) (citing Howerdd v. Whitaker, 75 S.E.2d
572 (Ga. 1953)); see also Clemmons v. Grifﬁn, 498 S.E.2d 99, 100–01 (Ga. 1998) (holding
repairman burned due to improper wiring of air conditioning unit could not hold homeowner
liable for negligence of prior contractor in wiring unit); McCarthy v. Hiers, 59 S.E.2d 22, 24 (Ga.
1950); Williamson v. Kidd, 15 S.E.2d 801, 803 (Ga. 1941); S. Bell Tel. Co. v. Starnes, 50 S.E. 343,
344 (Ga. 1905).
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force the occupants of land to anticipate the existence of hazards they have no
reason to believe exist and, therefore, impose a duty to exercise extraordinary care
in order to uncover latent defects.157

.EGLIGENT )NmICTION OF %MOTIONAL $ISTRESS
The court correctly ruled against Hendricks in her ﬁnal claim, NIED, as
Hendricks did not observe her son’s injuries or the immediate aftermath without
material change.158 When discussing the fundamentals of NIED in 'ATES, the
court explained that the essence of this tort is the shock caused by the perception
of an especially horrendous event.159 The court stated, “[i]t is more than the shock
one suffers when he learns of the death or injury of a child, sibling or parent
over the phone, from a witness, or at the hospital.”160 The claim Linda Hendricks
asserted did not meet the requirements of this rule.161
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has often expressed the need to limit claims
in this area and cautions that allowing a plaintiff to assert a claim without observing
the injuries to the victim, or at least arrive before material change occurs, would
open a ﬂoodgate of litigation in this area.162 In addition, the ﬁnancial burdens
placed upon defendants will increase if recovery is more easily attainable.163 While
the law should provide redress for a plaintiff ’s suffering, the law should not inﬂict
undue harm upon occupants by imposing unreasonably excessive measures of
liability.164
157

Sisson, 628 S.E.2d at 235 (citing Armenise v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, 466 S.E.2d 58
(Ga. 1995)).
158

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 686.

159

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 199 (quoting Yandrich v. Radic, 433 A.2d 459, 461 (Pa. 1981)).

160

)D (citing John D. Burley, $ILLON 2EVISITED 4OWARD A "ETTER 0ARADIGM FOR "YSTANDER #ASES,
43 OHIO ST. L.J. 931, 948 (1982) (emphasis added)).
161

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 686.

162

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 197 (stating the burden that most worries the court is the burden that
an overbroad liability would impose on the court system). Administrative concerns include the
possibility of multiplicity of suits and the burden to the court system due to increased litigation.
)D; see also Larsen, 81 P.3d at 199, 202. In addition, due to the nature of this cause of action, the
court may be burdened with even more potentially fraudulent claims if it recognizes the exception
Hendricks asserted. 'ATES, 719 P.2d at 197; see also Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 828 (Cal.
1989) (stating greater certainty and a more reasonable limit on the exposure to liability for negligent
conduct is possible by limiting the right to recover for negligently caused emotional distress to
plaintiffs who personally and contemporaneously perceive the injury-producing event and its
traumatic consequences).
163

'ATES, 719 P.2d at 197 (referring to the district court’s concern that such actions will result
in a burden to the individual defendant and impose upon the public the unwarranted economic
burden of increased insurance premiums, but ruling insurance will help spread the loss); Ochoa v.
Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1985).
164
Bischoff v. Kohlrenken, 449 A.2d 1347, 1349 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1982) (quoting Portee
v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 527 (N.J., 1980)).
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Finally, even though the (ENDRICKS court discussed the telephone call between
Hendricks and her husband, the court did not need to address the issue, because
the tort of NIED clearly requires a plaintiff to prove the emotional distress he or
she suffers is a result of the defendant’s negligence.165 The court already indicated
Hendricks failed to meet her burden in proving the Hurleys knew or had reason
to know the well presented a dangerous condition, and this precluded their
negligence.166

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in (ENDRICKS V (URLEY, properly afﬁrmed
the grant of summary judgment on Hendricks’s negligent supervision, loss
of consortium, negligent inspection of premises, and negligent inﬂiction of
emotional distress claims.167 However, the court would have been more persuasive
in its ruling had it evaluated the negligent supervision claim under the traditional
eight-factor test used for assessing the imposition of duty in Wyoming.168

165

Sims v. Gen. Motors Corp., 751 P.2d 357, 366 (Wyo. 1988).

166

(ENDRICKS, 184 P.3d at 685.

167

See supra notes 95–166 and accompanying text.

168

See supra notes 105-42 and accompanying text.
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